Is it possible? Will the nitrogen problem now be solved?

This article was written by journalist Jurgen Tiekstra, who closely follows the nitrogen issue. He is an editor at Binnenlands Bestuur, works as a freelancer, and wrote the book: The Climate Debate as a Distorting Mirror.

The time has come: Femke Wiersma is stepping down as Minister of Agriculture. Her party, the BBB, rose to prominence on the wave of farmer protests against her predecessors’ nitrogen policy. But those days are over: the BBB now holds only four seats in the House of Representatives. Wiersma herself will remain a member of the House, but from now on she will speak out on entirely different issues, such as defense, housing, and the royal family. Three motions of no confidence and one motion of censure did not bring her down as Minister of Agriculture, but the recent elections did.

Does this mean yet another major shift in nitrogen policy? Well, no.

On the contrary. The incoming cabinet will continue the policies she began as minister. There is no real return to the policies of her predecessors: Christianne van der Wal (VVD) and Carola Schouten (ChristenUnie).

The only thing back on the table are the so-called provincial land-use planning processes, which the Schoof administration had put an end to. As you read this, the provinces are currently lining up for the federal funds that will hopefully be directed their way. Those funds can be used to reclassify farmers’ agricultural land or to establish nitrogen-free zones around nature reserves.

But other than that, a lot of things remain the same.

Wiersma is leaving, but what remains?

Because, just like Wiersma, the new cabinet also wants to remove the Critical Deposit Value (KDW) from the Nitrogen Act, which dates back to Carola Schouten’s tenure (2021). This KDW indicates roughly how much nitrogen load the various vulnerable nature areas can withstand.

The new cabinet also wants to introduce a mathematical lower limit into the Aerius calculation model. That model calculates how much nitrogen falls on each hectare of nature reserve as a result of emissions from a dairy farm, a highway widening project, or the construction of a new residential neighborhood. The reason is that it has been known since at least the Hordijk Advisory Committee report in 2020 that Aerius is not suitable for modeling the deposition of such small units over such small areas.

The new cabinet, too, wants to replace the old deposition policy of Schouten and Van der Wal with an emissions policy, with emissions caps for each farmer. This means that the focus will no longer be on how much nitrogen falls on a hectare of natural habitat, but on how much is emitted by a dairy farmer.

Like Wiersma, the new cabinet also wants to replace process-based management with goal-based management. This means that farmers will have more autonomy in achieving the mandatory goals and will be less constrained by regulations.

Like Wiersma, the new cabinet also wants agriculture to emit 42–46 percent less ammonia by 2035 compared to 2019 (Ammonia is by far the most important nitrogen compound for farmers.) Even though the government knows that Johan Vollenbroek’s action group MOB cited this as a reason to file new lawsuits, MOB has calculated that these percentages are too low to meet the reduction targets currently stipulated by law.

New Minister, Different Policy?

Is former Deventer alderman Jaimi van Essen a secret agricultural lobbyist? Surely not. But for now, it doesn’t appear that he will pursue a nitrogen policy in the coming cabinet term that is any different from that of his predecessor, who has been branded a lobbyist.

Perhaps some people are now saying: “Unlike the current government with BBB, the incoming government is really putting a knife to farmers’ throats. Consider this sentence from the coalition agreement: ‘If the 2035 nitrogen target is not met, livestock or phosphate quotas for farms will be reduced as a last resort.’”

That seems crystal clear. Yet in September 2025, a letter to Parliament from Wiersma stated almost exactly the same thing: “If this does not happen and the livestock farmer fails to meet the standard by 2035, a sanction such as a fine or an order subject to a penalty for noncompliance will follow.” And: “As the most severe measure, the government provides, in exceptional cases of structural and culpable non-compliance, for enforcement measures limiting the number of animals that may be kept on the farm—for example, by (temporarily) freezing or revoking the use of a production right.”

Others might now argue: At least the new cabinet is once again proposing a 20-billion-euro nitrogen fund, just like the Rutte IV cabinet. That’s true; for example, more money will go to the provinces again. But don’t count your chickens before they hatch: the Schoof cabinet’s financial projections extended through 2030, while the new cabinet’s extend through 2035. In practice, the difference over the coming years amounts to only a few billion. That’s not going to make a big difference.

The fact is that recent nitrogen policy cannot be reduced to agricultural lobbying and BBB. I already wrote that in September 2024. I am not emphasizing the latter out of vanity, but out of genuine astonishment at the persistent misunderstandings surrounding the notoriously intractable nitrogen issue.

Will the Netherlands finally be able to break free from the nitrogen crisis?